the warm glow effects of their own public goods provision. 1 Thus, one consumer's public goods provision could not constitute a perfect substitute for the other consumers' provision. For example, when someone paints his house on a residential street, (provided the color choice is in the taste his neighbors), his action not only benefits him but also his neighbors. At the same time, having one of his neighbors houses painted will not substitute for having his own house painted.
2
In the warm glow model, free riding is shown to be less severe, crowding out is not complete, and neutrality of income redistribution does not hold. The above theoretical predictions are broadly in line with both empirical and experimental evidence.
Despite the importance of the warm glow model in subsequent research, surprisingly no competitive equilibrium for this model has been developed yet. Not only a price based approach to implement efficient outcomes is a highly desirable mechanism for its normative prescriptions, but also the outcome could potentially serve as a point of reference to measure free-riding and welfare loss (see for example, Cornes and Sandler (1984,1996) , Temimi (2001) and Gaube (2006) ). The notion of competitive equilibrium in public goods economies originates in the early work of Lindahl (1919) who introduced the concept of personalized prices for public goods. With private goods, different people can consume different bundles, but in equilibrium they all must pay the same prices. With public goods, everyone is faced with an equal provision, but consumers may pay different prices according to their preferences. The Lindahl equilibrium is typically more of a normative price based mechanism for the allocation of public goods rather than a positive description of the market mechanism itself. Since, the individual aspect of personalized prices undermines the price taking behavior assumption of competitive markets. A consumer will quickly learn to conceal his true preferences in order to take advantage of the public goods provision. The work of Foley (1967 Foley ( ,1970 , Fabre-Sender (1969), Milleron (1972) Bergstrom(1976) and Roberts (1974) show the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium by expanding either the commodity spaces or the price system and appealing to a standard existence results for a private goods economy. Khan and Vohra (1987) 1 In the standard public good provision consumer i is assumed to have a utility function of the form u i (x i , G) where x i is consumer's i private goods consumption, and G is the aggregate supply of public goods. Andreoni's approach introduces a direct utility for each consumer from his own provision of the public good. In his formulation, if consumer's i provides g i to the public good, his utility function is of the form u i (x i , g i , G). 2 This example was kindly suggested to us by Ted Bergstrom.
and Bonnisseau (1991) prove the existence of Lindahl equilibrium with nonconvex production technology including possibly increasing-returns to scale technologies. Conley (1994) , Wooders(1997) and Florenzano and del Mercato (2006) show the existence of Lindahl equilibrium through subtle context specific core-equilibrium convergence. More recently, the work of Boyd and Conley (1997) , Conley and Smith (2005) and Murty (2006) show the existence of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities, in which the first welfare theorem could be interpreted as a Coase-like Theorem. It is worth noticing that, pure public goods could be accommodated in their model as a special case of additive externalities. Our warm glow equilibrium resembles the Lindahl equilibrium by considering personalized prices. However, due to the warm glow effects, each consumer is endowed with two sets of personalized prices, one personalized price to finance his own public good provision and another one personalized price to finance other consumers provisions. Hence, unlike the Lindahl mechanism, each consumer values differently his own provision and other consumers' provisions. Having defined these personalized prices a warm glow equilibrium is then defined as a decentralized competitive equilibrium. It turns out that the warm glow equilibrium has interesting properties. Indeed, the warm glow equilibrium is Pareto efficient (first welfare theorem) and a Pareto efficient could be decentralized as a warm glow equilibrium (second welfare theorem). In addition, under general hypothesis, a warm glow equilibrium is shown to exist. It is worth noticing that, in the absence of warm glow effects, i.e. the standard model of public goods provision, our warm glow equilibrium coincide with the Lindahl equilibrium. It remains to be seen whether other solution concepts in the Lindahlian tradition such as ratio equilibrium Kaneko (1977) and cost-share equilibrium Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989) could be defined for a warm glow economy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a warm glow economy and defines the warm glow equilibrium. We show the welfare theorems in Section 3. In Section 4, We establish the existence of warm glow equilibrium. We discuss different formulations of warm glow utility functions in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Model
We consider a public goods economy E, with L private goods, K public goods. There are N consumers in the economy, each of whom is characterized by his consumption set R L+K + . We will often write consumption bundles for consumer i in the form (
is interpreted as consumer's i private goods consumption and g i ∈ R K refers to consumer's i public goods provision. The aggregate production technology is described by the production set
For simplicity, we assume that Y is a closed convex cone with vertex the origin; satisfying the usual properties of irreversibility, no free production, and free disposal. Each consumer has a positive initial endowment of private goods w i ∈ R L ++ . We assume that there are no initial endowments of public goods. Each consumer i preferences can be represented by a utility function u i (x i , g i , G −i ), where G −i = j =i g j is the aggregate supply of public goods of other consumers. 3 We assume that each utility function u i satisfies the following properties: 
The production set is assumed to satisfy: 
Feasible allocations
Thus , we require the net inputs of private goods and outputs of public goods to be consistent with the production technology.
Pareto efficient allocations
is (weakly) Pareto efficient if it is feasible and if there exists no feasible allocation ((x i , g i ), i ∈ N ) such that for each consumer i we have
Warm glow equilibrium
A warm glow equilibrium is ((
is a price system for public goods, π i ∈ R K + is the personalized price of consumer's i own public goods provision, and π −i ∈ R K + is the personalized price of consumer's i for others' public goods provision, such that
(Maximization of utility given personalized prices and public goods provision);
(iii). For each consumer i ∈ N ,
(For each public good provision personalized prices sum up to the price of the public goods).
In the voluntary contribution equilibrium consumer i faces the price p g to finance his own public goods provision g i . In the warm glow equilibrium, due to the external effects that consumer's i public goods provision g i has on other consumers welfare, each consumer j ∈ N \ {i} will finance g i at a personalized price of π −j . Then, consumer i faces a personalized price
If we consider the standard public good model then one has
. The perfect substitution between g i and G −i for consumer i implies that π i = π −i . Thus, in the case of the standard public good provision model our warm glow equilibrium coincides with the Lindahl equilibrium.
Welfare theorems for a warm glow economy
We now state the first welfare theorem for a warm glow economy: a warm glow equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Hence, amongst other things the warm glow equilibrium provides a price based mechanism to achieve efficient outcomes. The argument is similar to the textbook proof of the first welfare theorem.
Theorem 1: (First Welfare Theorem for a warm glow economy)
A warm glow equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
Proof: Suppose the Theorem is false. Then there is a warm glow equilibrium ((
) with the property that the feasible allocation 7 ((x i , g i ), i ∈ N ) is not Pareto efficient. This means that there exists a feasible allocation ((x i , g i ) , i ∈ N ) such that for each consumer i
From utility maximization, it holds that for each consumer i:
Given the fact that for each i ∈ N, G −i = j =i g j , summing up over the above inequalities, one obtains
, rearranging the terms with respect to each consumer public goods provision, will give us
This yields a contradiction to property (i) in the definition of warm glow equilibrium.
In the following we provide a decentralization of Pareto efficient allocations as warm glow equilibria. Our result shows that we can decentralize any interior Pareto efficient allocation with prices. This shows that an analogue to the second welfare theorem also holds for the warm glow economy. Similar results for standard public goods economy were first introduced by Foley (1970) . In his approach, Foely (1970) considers the concept of public competitive equilibrium, which corresponds to a Lindahl equilibrium, after-tax redistribution. 
Proof:
The idea of the proof follows Foley (1970) in extending the commodity space for public goods. However, due to the warm glow effects, our extension is quite different from Foley's (1970). Indeed, for each consumer our extension distinguishes between own public goods provision and others' public goods provision. Thus, a larger number of commodities is considered.
We define the set:
Since Y is a convex cone F is also a convex cone. We next define the set
The set D is convex and nonempty since the utility functions are increasing and quasi-concave. for all (y, g 1 , G −1 , . . . , g N π 1 , π −1 , . . . , π N , π −N ) · (y, g 1 , G −1 , . . . , g N for all (y, g 1 , G −1 , . . . , g N , G −N ) ∈ D   (p, π 1 , π −1 , . . . , π N , π −N ) · (y, g 1 , G −1 , . . . , g N 
Since F is a closed convex cone with vertex zero, it follows that we can choose C = 0. Moreover, since the allocation ((x i , g i ) , i ∈ N ) is Pareto efficient we have
Hence, it follows from (i) and (ii) in the separation theorem that
Now, we claim that, for any two consumers j 1 and j 2 , it holds that
Suppose this was not the case, then, without loss of generality, one could assume that for some public goods, say the k th , it holds that (g i , . . . , g N ) , defined as follows − w i ), g 1 , G −1 , . . . , g N , G −N 
Moreover, from (1) it follows that (p, π 1 , π −1 , . . . , π N , π −N ) · ( (x i − w i ), g 1 , G −1 , . . . , g N , G −N ) > 0, but, this contradicts property (i) of the separation theorem. Thus, we set up
From monotonicity of preferences it follows that
Otherwise, property (ii) of the separation theorem would be violated by increasing the consumption of any good with a negative price. Suppose that p = 0. Therefore, it holds that for some consumer i and public good k we have either (π i ) k > 0 or (π −i ) k > 0. Then, there will be a point F with strictly positive profit, which contradicts property (i) of the separation theorem.
Suppose that for some consumer i, and some consumption bundle (
Therefore, from (ii) in the separation theorem it holds that
Since only the terms relating to i differ from (1) one obtains
Assume that this was an equality. Since x i ∈ R L ++ there exists x i x i . By quasi-concavity and continuity, along the line joining (x i , g i , G −i ) and (x i , g i , G −i ) there is a point in the consumption set of i which, at the same time, is strictly preferred and costs less when compared to (x i , g i , G −i ). This would contradict property (ii) of the separation theorem.
Existence of warm glow equilibrium
As with any proposed solution concept, it is of paramount importance to show the existence of an equilibrium in significantly meaningful class of economies. Fortunately, Likewise the existence of Lindahl equilibrium is derived from standard existence results of competitive equilibrium in private goods economy, the existence of warm glow equilibrium in this paper is derived from standard existence result for Lindahl equilibrium. Indeed, the idea of the proof is to consider each consumer's public goods provision as a bundle of public goods on its own merit. Thus, understandably, this extension will capture the warm glow effects of each consumer's provision. Now, we state our main existence result for warm glow equilibrium. We define the utility functions u i for the auxiliary economy E such that
Using standard existence theorems (see for example , Foley (1970) , Milleron (1972) , Robert (1974) , and Florenzano and del Mercato (2006)) one could get the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium for the auxiliary economy E, ((x i , Π i ) i∈N , G, p) , that is, ((x i ) i∈N , G) is a feasible allocation in E, p is the price for private goods, (Π i ) i∈N are the associated personalized prices, and
and if
is the personalized price faced by consumer i to finance the public goods b g j . We claim that
which means the prices of producing each consumer's public goods provision are equal. Suppose this was not the case, then, without loss of generality, one could assume that for two consumers j 1 and j 2 and for the k th public good, it holds that
Let us consider again the following public goods bundle, G = (g i , . . . , g N ), defined as follows
This would contradict property (i) of the Lindahl equilibrium of the auxiliary economy E.
13
Now, we claim that for each consumer i and for any two consumers j 1 , j 2 ∈ N \ {i} one has Π
i . Suppose this was not the case. Then, without loss of generality, one could assume that for some public goods, say the k th , it holds that (Π
Therefore, by monotonicity of preferences there exists (
This yields a contradiction to property (ii) of the Lindahl equilibrium of the auxiliary economy E.
Let us set
) is a warm glow equilibrium.
Andreoni's utility function formulation
In the warm glow model Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( ,1990 ), consumer's i public goods provision g i enters into the arguments of his utility function twice, that is
In the voluntary contribution equilibrium, the Andreoni's formulation of the utility function leads to an easier characterization of the theoretical results than this paper formulation of the utility function u i (x i , g i , G −i ). Andreoni (2006) argues that, amongst other things, the straight forward expression of convexity in his formulation of utility function has proved beneficial to the characterization. Moreover, it has the methodological advantage of being flexible to accommodate the two opposite cases of standard public goods provision model and pure warm glow model. In our framework, since we are interested in the competitive equilibrium, the two formulations of the utility functions will lead us to same result. This is due to the fact that we are interested in the underlying preferences rather than their utility presentations. To illustrate the above observation, assume that instead of u i (x i , g i , G −i ) representing the preferences of consumer i we have a utility function of the form v i (x i , g i , G) . Then, the budget constraint of consumer i could be re-written as
and the utility maximization of consumer i could be re-written as
Conclusion
Price based mechanisms achieving efficient outcomes are highly desirable in public economics for their insights to both normative and positive analysis. This paper introduces a competitive mechanism for a warm glow economy and shows the three fundamental principals of general equilibrium. In the public economics literature, the Lindahl competitive mechanism is often criticized for its lack of incentive compatibility since consumers have incentives to report false preferences. It will be interesting to investigate in a warm glow economy whether the in part private good aspect of consumers' public goods provision will lead to more truthful reports of consumers preferences and as a result the warm glow equilibrium allocations are more likely to be achieved.
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